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At a broad level, a structural economic model 
is one where the structure of decision making 
is fully incorporated in the specification of 
the model. By specifying the parameters that 
describe the preferences and constraints of the 
 decision-making process, structural models 
deliver counterfactual predictions. The ability to 
provide policy counterfactuals sets them apart 
from  reduced-form models.1 But the detailed 
description of the decision-making problem 
will typically place tougher requirements on 
measurement and rely, in part, on stronger 
assumptions.
Structural models aim to identify three dis-
tinct, but related, objects: (i) structural “deep” 
parameters: e.g., Frisch and Marshallian elas-
ticities; (ii) underlying mechanisms: e.g., 
partial and  self-insurance; (iii) policy counter-
factuals: e.g.,  ex ante tax policy evaluations. 
It is useful, therefore, to distinguish between 
“ full-structural” dynamic models and quasi- (or 
semi-) structural models, the latter identifying a 
subset of parameters and/or mechanisms rather 
than full counterfactuals.
The focus in this paper is on structural 
microeconometric models for policy analysis. 
Emphasis is given to models that minimize 
assumptions on the structural function of inter-
est and on unobserved heterogeneity; and to 
approaches that align moments from structural 
and “reduced form” approaches. The discussion 
1 Hurwicz (1962) defines structural models in terms 
of invariance to the counterfactual experiments they are 
designed to address. 
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is limited to single agent models omitting, for 
space reasons, the many important contributions 
that use equilibrium concepts, network interac-
tions, and market structure to help secure identi-
fication. The goal throughout is to highlight the 
use of structural models to improve our under-
standing of observed behavior and to provide 
reliable policy counterfactuals.
The following sections of the paper draw on 
work in three related areas. Section I: revealed 
preference and unobserved heterogeneity; 
Section II:  discrete choice models and wel-
fare reform; and Section III: dynamic structural 
models and human capital investments. These 
are areas that have extensive policy applications 
where structural functions and policy counterfac-
tuals are well defined; that ask  well-formulated 
questions, e.g.,  ex ante impact of taxes, prices 
and wages, and optimal design; that analyze 
static choice and dynamic choice; and, that use 
new data, new methods, and new computational 
developments. Section IV concludes.
I. Revealed Preference and Heterogeneity
The structure of economic  decision-making 
models delivers restrictions that can be used 
to recover counterfactuals. For example, the 
revealed preference (RP) conditions of con-
sumer choice theory can be used to place 
bounds on consumer responses to new prices 
and incomes enabling us to examine the impact 
counterfactual tax and redistributive policies (Blundell, Browning, and Crawford 2008). 
Recent studies have extended these results to 
structural  models of habits (Crawford 2010) 
and collective family labor supply (Cherchye, 
De Rock, and Vermeulen 2011), as well as other 
deviations from simple RP.
Consider a simple structural demand func-
tion:  y = g( p, I, z, u) that describes demand for 
good(s)  y by consumer  (z, u) facing prices and 
income  ( p, I) . RP inequalities summarize struc-
tural information and can be used to bound (set 
identify)  individual demand counterfactuals. An 
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additive specification for unobserved hetero-
geneity  u is implausible in consumer models. 
With non-separable  u and monotonicity, con-
ditional nonparametric quantiles can be shown 
to identify individual structural demands (see 
Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin 2014).2 With 
multivariate heterogeneity only certain features 
of average welfare contrasts are identified (see 
Hausman and Newey 2016). The conditional 
independence assumption on  u may also be 
relaxed to allow for endogeneity of prices  p (see Blundell, Horowitz, and Parey forthcom-
ing). That study also provides new insights and 
policy counterfactuals for individual gasoline 
demand, highlighting the empirical value of RP 
restrictions.
II. Discrete Choice and Welfare Reform
Structural discrete choice models have 
been the workhorse of the empirical analy-
sis of  welfare-benefit reform. The plethora of 
welfare-benefit and tax proposals, and actual 
reforms, that surfaced in the late 1980s and 
1990s gave new impetus to their development. 
Well-specified models incorporate choices not 
only over  part-time and  full-time work but also 
over different welfare and tax credit programs, 
allowing for stigma costs and accounting for the 
complicated  nonlinear budget constraints that 
reflect the important overlaps of the many wel-
fare programs,  tax credits, and personal taxes.
This area is ideal for examining the role of 
structural models in policy analysis. Using the 
Mirrlees Review of tax reform as an example, 
Blundell (2012) identifies the following five key 
steps in assembling the foundations for empirical 
policy research: (i) uncovering the margins of 
adjustment; (ii) measuring effective incentives; (iii) understanding the importance of informa-
tion and complexity; (iv) estimating behavioral 
responses; and (v) counterfactual policy sim-
ulation and optimal design. Structural models 
are  center-ground in policy research, entering 
directly into steps (iv) and (v), but steps (i)–(iii) 
are also essential for a  well-specified model and 
reliable policy advice.
Step (i) examines the key margins of adjust-
ment. For example, the margins of labor market 
2 With multiple demands, invertibility in  u is not suffi-
cient for identification (see Matzkin 2007). 
adjustment for tax and welfare policy analysis. 
Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque (2011) show the 
importance of a lifetime view of employment 
and hours with key differences between exten-
sive and intensive margins that are accentu-
ated at particular ages for different education 
groups.
Next comes step (ii), the measurement of 
effective incentives. An advantage of structural 
models is the requirement for a precise state-
ment of constraints. For tax and welfare policy 
this requires a detailed institutional knowledge 
of overlapping taxes,  tax credits, and welfare 
benefits. As the careful studies in Moffitt (2016) 
show, modern tax and  welfare-benefit systems 
are complex with many overlapping  welfare 
benefits and taxes. If we are to accurately 
recover preferences we need to understand not 
only these overlaps but also the salience of the 
various tax and welfare benefit incentives. This 
is step (iii) and requires a careful modeling of 
welfare program participation among eligible 
families.
It is only after having built a clear picture 
from these first three steps that the rigorous 
econometric analysis of structure and causality 
comes into play. At step (iv) an eclectic mix of 
reduced form and structural approaches is to be 
preferred. There is a strong complementarity 
between these approaches.  Quasi-experimental 
evaluations can provide robust measures of cer-
tain policy impacts but are necessarily local and 
limited in scope. Structural estimation allows 
counterfactual policy simulations which can 
then feed into a policy (re-)design analysis in 
step (v).
Structural discrete choice models have 
been used extensively to assess the impact of 
 means-tested welfare programs, tax credits, 
and potential reforms to them, see Blundell and 
Hoynes (2004). These policies are directed at 
relatively poor families with low labor market 
attachment and low earnings. Policy counterfac-
tuals are required as these reform proposals typ-
ically involve  non-marginal changes to the  tax 
credit and welfare system.3
The key elements of a structural model for 
welfare reform (see Keane and Moffitt 1998) 
3 For marginal policy reform,  semi-structural models are 
often sufficient and use robustly estimated local derivatives 
of structural functions, as in Chetty (2009).
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involve a precise definition of the budget con-
straint, with all the tax/ tax credit and benefit 
interactions. The specification of  preferences 
over different hours and program options that 
give rise to multinomial choice across discrete 
hours and welfare combinations. Heterogeneity 
is essential, reflecting observed differences 
across families through measured demograph-
ics, and unobservable differences in “tastes” for 
work, stigma costs, childcare costs, and fixed 
costs of work.
There are many examples of where these 
models perform well, their  ex ante predictions 
matching  post-reform behavior (see Blundell 
2012). In the more convincing examples, iden-
tification is based on sources of plausibly exog-
enous variation in welfare and tax rules across 
time and locations. The models have also 
proven invaluable for counterfactual evalua-
tions of alternative policies and have been used 
to examine optimal design (see Blundell and 
Shephard 2012). These models identify wage 
and income elasticities at the extensive and 
intensive margins across different demographic 
groups, proving a secure basis for targeting 
earned income tax expansions at low-income 
families. Complexity and overlapping bene-
fit withdrawal rates are clearly inefficient and 
inhibit  take-up, providing a clear motivation 
for the integration of benefits and tax credits (see Brewer, Saez, and Shephard 2011).
Recent studies seek to further relax the 
assumptions on preferences in structural mod-
els of labor supply and taxation, using only use 
only the restrictions from revealed preference 
to identify some key parameters of interest. For 
example, Blomquist et al. (2015) estimate the 
conditional mean of taxable income imposing 
revealed preference restrictions and allowing for 
measurement errors. This work aims at a robust 
measure of the structural taxable income func-
tion rather than identifying the full optimization 
problem. Manski (2014) develops conditions 
where partial prediction of tax revenue under 
proposed policies and partial knowledge of the 
welfare function for utilitarian policy evaluation 
is feasible.
There remain many areas where structural 
models in the field are in need of further refine-
ment. Human capital investment, persistent 
wage shocks, and search frictions add poten-
tially valuable dynamic considerations, to which 
we now turn.
III. Dynamic Structural Models
Identification of structural models in a 
dynamic optimizing environment requires strong 
assumptions on subjective discount rates and the 
distribution of beliefs. For example, building on 
the original work by Rust (1994), Magnac and 
Thesmar (2002) show that in discrete choice 
settings the utility functions in each alternative 
cannot be (nonparametrically) identified with-
out external information on the distribution of 
unobserved preference shocks and the discount 
rate, (see also Arcidiacono and Miller 2011).
The upshot is that particular care needs to be 
taken in specifying, estimating, and validating 
dynamic structural models. One reaction is to 
focus on a subset of structural parameters that 
are more robustly identified. As already noted, 
one can view this as a “semi” or “quasi” struc-
tural approach. For example, one may estimate 
“ life-cycle” consistent preferences by condition-
ing on consumption (or net saving) (see Blundell 
and Walker 1986). Another example is the partial 
insurance literature (see Blundell,  Pistaferri, and 
Preston 2008). Even so, these  quasi-structural 
approaches are not robust to intertemporal 
 non-separability that occurs in models incorpo-
rating human capital decisions. For this we need 
a fully specified structural model.
The  groundbreaking work in the develop-
ment of structural models of  life-cycle labor 
supply choices was carried out by Heckman and 
MaCurdy (1980), subsequently developed for 
discrete choice decisions and integrated with 
human capital choices by Keane and Wolpin (1997) among others. That work uncovered key 
differences between  short-run and longer-run 
responses to wage changes and found that, once 
human capital choices are incorporated, esti-
mated labor supply responses from static models 
can be quite misleading.
The advantage of these structural models is 
that they identify  life-cycle counterfactuals and 
mechanisms, e.g., the impact of tax reforms and 
the “insurance value” of redistributive policies. 
As a recent example, consider the Blundell et al. (2016) application to education choices, experi-
ence capital and female labor supply. That study 
uses panel data and the time series of tax,  tax 
credit, welfare, and tuition reforms in the United 
Kingdom to identify the structural parameters of 
human capital and labor supply choices, condi-
tioning on early  life-history variables.
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At the heart of the structural model is a 
dynamic wage equation estimated jointly with 
education and life-cycle labor supply decisions. 
This features a concave work experience term 
on wages and persistent shocks. The structural 
model fit is shown to be good. But this is only 
achieved by allowing returns to work experi-
ence to differ by education level, by condition-
ing on extensive background factors, and by 
including a  part-time work penalty in experi-
ence capital.
The results from this structural model deliver 
some key new insights: (i) structural parame-
ters: experience effects display strong dynamic 
complementarity, with lower experience effects 
for the low educated and for those in  part-time 
work; (ii) mechanisms: the insurance value 
of  tax credits is a substantial part of welfare 
gain; and (iii) counterfactuals: lower educa-
tion women with young kids have larger supply 
responses, implying  tax credits can be an opti-
mal design, although they induce little earnings 
progression. There are also found to be signifi-
cant, but small, effects of  tax credit expansion 
on education choice, attenuating some of the 
employment gains.
As a  by-product the structural model allows 
a reconciliation of past results. That is it 
can help explain past (static) structural and 
 quasi-experimental results. Human capital 
complementarity and the  part-time work pen-
alty imply negligible experience capital wage 
dynamics for low-educated women, explaining 
why static discrete models that accounted for 
detailed tax and benefit interactions performed 
well for low-income households.
There are many other important recent con-
tributions to the structural modeling of dynamic 
 life-cycle choices—too many to discuss in 
detail. Key examples include: Cunha, Heckman, 
and Schennach (2010) who provide important 
new results on the identification and estimation 
of the “household production” of early years 
skill formation; French (2005) which shows the 
key role of retirement incentives separate from 
preferences at retirement; Meghir, Low, and 
Pistaferri (2015) who separate employment risk 
from wage risk; and Low and Pistaferri (2016) 
who examine the dynamic incentives in the dis-
ability system. All of these studies provide con-
vincing evidence on key structural parameters 
and counterfactuals, helping build our knowl-
edge base on  life-cycle behavior.
IV. Conclusions
Structural models play a key role in under-
standing economic behavior and in policy design. 
They complement reduced form and experi-
mental approaches by explicitly incorporating 
restrictions from economic  decision-making 
models. By doing so they make three related, 
but distinct, contributions: they identify “deep” 
structural parameters; they provide a clear 
insight into the mechanisms underlying the 
observed behavior; and they provide counterfac-
tuals. In addition, they can be used to reconcile 
earlier results and consequently help build a 
knowledge base for policy research.
Structural models make explicit the assump-
tions on preferences and constraints being used 
to estimate parameters, mechanisms, and coun-
terfactuals. These assumptions need to be tested, 
assessed, and relaxed wherever possible. This 
has been the theme taken here, focusing on the 
structural analysis of labor supply and consumer 
behavior. Reliable structural analyses in these 
areas acknowledge the importance of aligning 
moments from structural models with reduced 
form evidence and minimizing the reliance on 
unnecessary assumptions.
An important recent development has been 
applications which combine structural and 
experimental evidence. For example, Todd and 
Wolpin (2006) use experimental data to validate 
a dynamic structural model of child schooling 
and fertility. Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2012) use experimental data to estimate general 
equilibrium effects. Karlan and Zinman (2009) 
use a consumer credit experiment to distinguish 
between adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2012) design an exper-
iment to identify the impact of monitoring and 
financial incentives on teacher absence and on 
learning.
I leave the final words to Frisch (1933, p. 2) 
“No amount of statistical information, however 
complete and exact, can by itself explain eco-
nomic phenomena. … we need the guidance of 
a powerful theoretical framework. Without this 
no significant interpretation and coordination of 
our observations will be possible.”
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